outcome, but indeed a process that contributes to the legitimacy of the resulting texts.
The recently concluded UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the Rules on Transparency, or the Rules) mark a watershed moment in such multilateral rule-making, because harmonization of practice in this respect was seen to benefit not only the main actors of the arbitral process, but also the public interest at large. Thus, the role of IO observers to UNCITRAL, and the willingness of States to accommodate the public interest, were both critical components to the successful completion of the Rules.
This chapter sets out to provide (a) a background on the rule-making process at UNCITRAL; (b) the role of both governmental and non-governmental IOs, as well as States, in the genesis and development of the Rules on Transparency; and (c) the content of the Rules on Transparency in light of compromises achieved during the consensus-making process.
1
Background on the Rule-making Process at UNCITRAL
1.1
The Establishment of UNCITRAL and Its Implications for Rulemaking in the Field of International Trade Law UNCITRAL came into being pursuant to a mandate from the General Assembly of the United Nations in 19661 in order to pursue the goal of the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law. A report commissioned by the General Assembly the previous year2 calling for consideration of steps to be taken for progressive development in the field of private international law, with a particular view to promoting international trade (the Schmitthof Study, or the Study),3 had noted an "increasing awareness" that a modern legislative framework provided a necessary foundation for sound economic and social progress, and a "legal lag" in the realization.4 The Study went on to
